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Introduction
Political tolerance is a key democratic attitude and a basic democratic virtue. A tolerant population is believed to promote a well-functioning democracy at large and, in addition, from the perspective of normative democratic theory, truly democratic citizens must refrain from denying groups they dislike their political and social rights (see, e.g. Mendus 1999) . Being politically tolerant is part of fulfilling the obligations of democratic citizenship (see e.g. Petersson et al 1989) .
Several studies have concluded tolerance levels to be alarmingly low (Marquart-Pyatt & Paxton 2007; Viegas 2007; Peffley & Rohrschneider 2003) . Majorities often hold intolerant views, even in countries that for a long time been democratically stable and successful. Moreover, around Europe, xenophobic and right wing parties are gaining ground, and manifestations of intolerance towards immigrants, certain ethnicities, and sexual minorities seem to be increasing.
Concerns have even been raised that -unless the development is changed -democracy may be threatened in several parts of the continent. How to improve tolerance, then? One dominant theory concerns learning, and states that tolerance has to be learned by participating in democratic and pluralistic arenas within political and societal environments. Since the 1950s empirical research has been testing this theory, focusing on different factors included within its theoretical realm, such as participation in educational institutions and in associational life. Mostly, it has given the theory support. As with many other political attitudes and behaviors, U.S. is the empirically most investigated country. True, some studies consider other parts of the Western world, as well as Eastern Europe, and certain countries in Africa and Asia (for overviews of this research, see Widmalm & Oskarsson 2013:539-40) . But Scandinavia, and Sweden not the least, has been investigated to a very little extent, and mostly in broad and general country comparative studies (Marquart-Pyatt & Paxton 2007; Peffley & Rohrschneider 2003) . Given political, social, and cultural differences it is not evident that findings in previous research are valid in Sweden. Being a stable and comparatively successful democracy for a long time, this country is also known for its political and socioeconomic egalitarianism, its comprehensive welfare state and comparatively successful integration policy model (see e.g., Eger 2010) . In fact, Sweden ranks among the most tolerant countries in the world (Viegas 2007; Peffley & Rohrschneider 2003) . On the other hand have voices been raised that intolerance is increasing, signs being the recent electoral success of the xenophobic political party Sweden Democrats (sverigedemokraterna) as well as more frequent public expressions of intolerance towards immigrants. Nonetheless it seems justified to investigate this country, in order to test the generalizability of the learning theories.
The purpose of this paper is to empirically test the relevance of various factors included in the learning theory, using Swedish data. The tests are conducted with quantitative methods using a survey which is particularly suitable, more precisely the Citizen Survey (conducted in 2003). It allows better and more complete investigations of the learning factors than surveys used in prior studies on Sweden (mostly World Values Survey; see in particular, Marquart-Pyatt & Paxton 2007; Peffley & Rohrschneider 2003) .
The paper begins with an overview of prior research followed by a discussion of how to measure tolerance. Then a presentation takes place of the data and variables being used, as well as the analysis section. The paper ends with a concluding discussion of the findings.
Previous research
What makes an individual political tolerant, i.e. willing to grant political rights to others and even to members of groups she or he strongly opposes? This is a non-trivial question, according to tolerance researchers, as citizen's natural state actually is to be intolerant. Our psychological dispositions are more or less prone to be suspicious to strangers and to be sensible to possibly threatening situations and groups (see, in particular, Sniderman 1975) . What, then, makes us prepared to overcome our basic dispositions and allow our antagonists to hold political meetings, arrange demonstrations, etc.? Some kind of external influence is needed, according to learning theories of tolerance, as this attitude is a cognitively advanced phenomenon and therefore has to be learnt, (see e.g., Sullivan et al 1981) . Prior research mentions at least three different ways -or learning mechanisms -in which such processes can occur (for an overview, see Marquart-Pyatt & Paxton 2007) . Firstly, tolerance can be learned through contact with diverse groups. The idea is in line with the classical contact hypothesis, which originally concerned racial prejudice (Allport 1954) . It assumes that various kinds of social contact -e.g. between members of various ethnic groups, involving experiences with different kind of people and with different kind of ideas -may reduce such prejudice. Secondly, tolerance can increase through experiences with institutions which function in a more or less democratic way. Then democratic socialization may occur, with democratic norms being transmitted, one typically mentioned setting being educational institutions (see e.g., Weil 1989) . Thirdly, tolerance can be learnt through direct experience, i.e. using one's civil liberties by being politically active oneself (Peffley & Rohrschneider 2003) . Individuals who practice their civil liberties should be more convinced that exercising one's political rights is something good and therefore also more prone to allow others -including one's opponents -to perform such activities.
These three learning mechanisms do of course not exclude each other. In fact, they may take place more or less simultaneously and in the same environments. One important example is educational institutions, which can function both as socializing democratic settings and as environments where one may meet people of different opinions and ethnicities. Here I will not separate in detail between the different mechanisms, as the aim is primarily to empirically test the learning theory on a more general note and not to observe the mechanisms and processes involved in detail.
As pointed out above, certain parts of the learning theories have been empirically investigated rather thoroughly, in particular in the U.S. This is especially the case with education, as a positive effect of higher education on tolerance is probably the most recurrent finding within this research field (for an overview, see e.g., Hazama 2010; but see e.g., Jackman & Muha 1984) . Participation in other social institutions, in particular voluntary associations, also seems to increase tolerance (Rapp & Freitag 2014) . Moreover, positive influences of living in an urban area have been found. Higher exposure to different kinds of people and ideas are the assumed causes (Wilson 1991 (Wilson , 1994 Sullivan et al 1982) .
Working life is another crucial social environment. Unemployed individuals obviously lack access to one important everyday social environment where learning might take place (see e.g., Jahoda, Lazarsfeld & Zeisel 1971 [1933 ). Accordingly, it has been suggested that unemployment leads to political intolerance. Empirical research on the matter is however insufficient and results are somewhat contradictory, showing negative effects on tolerance in some countries such as the U.S. and no effects in the Scandinavian countries Denmark and Norway (Mutz & Mondak 2006 , Persell et al 2001 Pedersen 1996; Gaasholt & Togeby 1995; Hernes & Knudsen 1992) . It seems like the impact may be weaker in Scandinavian than in liberal welfare states (cf., Esping-Andersen 1990). Accordingly, strong effects are not expected in this case when studying Sweden.
All of these mentioned institutional arenas will be investigated empirically below. This also goes for political participation, the third suggested learning mechanism. Though empirical research is not comprehensive, existing studies in general do to some extent support this hypothesis, although not in all investigated countries (Marquart-Pyatt & Paxton 2007 : Peffley & Rohrschneider 2003 .
Empirical research where Sweden is analyzed separately basically consists of one study, conducted by Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) .
2 Moreover, their study only investigates two of the just mentioned learning factors, education and political participation. As for education, expected positive effects are found. 3 This is not the case with political participation, for which the correlation with tolerance is non-significant. However, the measure used (based on the World Values Surveys) is based on not only political activities but also the respondents' attitudes towards undertaking such activities. In line with learning theories it is participation in the institution or activity itself that affects tolerance, and the inclusion also of attitudes may cause misleading results (I will return to this discussion in the analysis section). When it comes to such social arenas as associational life, working life, and living in a city, the impacts on tolerance are unknown. In sum, then, more empirical research in the Swedish case is much called for.
Measuring political tolerance
A common definition of political tolerance is 'the willingness to respect political rights of individuals who belong to other groups' (see, e.g., Finkel et al 1999) . Often it is added that this willingness should apply not only to other groups in general but also to groups that one dislike. Hence, political demonstrations and meetings conducted by one's political opponents -and other groups one is against -should be accepted (Sullivan et al. 1982:784) .
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There are two dominating traditions as how to measure the concept in surveys. The first one is represented by Stouffer who in his seminal work (1955), focusing on the U.S. in the 1950s, examined individual's tolerance for actions undertaken by certain 'target groups'. More precisely, people were classified as intolerant if they denied civil liberties to socialists, atheists, or communists. This approach was later criticized for being confounded by the popularity of the selected groups. Sullivan and his colleagues (1979) therefore developed the content-controlled method, in which the respondents first are asked which group they like the least and then answer whether they are willing to extend political rights to the group in question (such as arranging a political meeting). The groups are selected from all over the political spectrum. This approach has also been criticized in different ways: e.g., for only considering left-wing and right-wing extremists, and to give a too vague picture of the degree of a person's tolerance level as only one group is selected (see e.g., Mondak & Sanders 2003:495-496 ).
This criticism is taken into consideration when tolerance is defined and measured here. The respondent's willingness to allow political rights to several social groups will be investigated, and no attention is paid to whether the respondent dislikes the group or not. Furthermore, tolerance will be regarded as a scale, ranging from full tolerance to full intolerance, depending on the number of groups one is tolerant or intolerant against. Finally, only groups are included that undoubtedly should be politically respected, namely stigmatized groups and ethnic minorities. The measure is then adequate, without question, as the political rights of these groups should be accepted, and may be considered as a 'baseline tolerance measure' from any reasonable democratic perspective. The measure on tolerance is based on five items. The respondents were asked whether they thought that immigrants, homosexuals, people of a different race, people with AIDS, and drug addicts, respectively, should be allowed to hold public meetings. The answers were added and summarized in an additive index variable, measuring the number of groups one is tolerant against. It was standardized so that 0 means intolerance against all groups and 1 means tolerance against all groups. 7 The variable is rather skewed, with most respondents reporting tolerant attitudes towards these groups, although there is still some variation (the mean is 0.9 and the standard deviation is 0.2)
Political participation refers to conventional forms of participation as well as more recently recognized non-parliamentary ways to bring about societal change (cf. Teorell et al 2007; Stolle et al 2005; Barnes and Kaase 1979) . Although political participation has been shown to be a multidimensional concept (see, e.g., Verba & Nie 1972) , for reasons of simplicity, I use an index variable consisting of items on all different participation forms included in the survey (such as voting, party activities, personal contacts, protests, and political consumerism). More precisely, the index is based on 19 items, and in the causal analyses below it has been logarithmized.
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As for socializing institutions, education measures the number of years spent in combined fulltime schooling and occupational training. Weak labor force attachment is coded 1 for respondents that are unemployed or housewife/houseman, or on disability/early retirement pension (or not working" for other reasons"), and 0 for others. Pensioner is coded as 1 for those who are retired/pensioner, and 0 for those who are employed (or are studying). 9 As for the level of urbanization, city is coded 1 for those who live in one of the three biggest cities in Sweden (Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmo) and 0 for others. Small town is coded 1 for those who live in smaller towns and 0 for others. Small community takes on the value 1 for those who live in smaller communities and 0 for others (the reference group is those who live in the countryside). Associational activity is based on questions about engagement in 28 different types of voluntary organizations. The measure includes a wide-ranging array of recreational organi-zations, interest and identity organizations, as well as ideological organizations. 10 The information was summarized with an additive index variable.
A number of control factors will be included in the analysis. Demographic factors, such as age and gender, sometimes have been found to correlate with tolerance. Younger individuals usually show higher levels of tolerance than older, and some studies have found men to be more tolerant than women (see, e.g., Bobo & Licari 1989; Golebiowska1999; but see, e.g., Togeby 1994) . Female is coded 1 for women and 0 for men, and age is the respondent's age the year the interview took place. Socioeconomic factors-such as class, income, and profession-have been found to correlate rather weakly with tolerance (see, e.g., Sullivan et al 1981) , but the class dummy variable white-collar will still be incorporated (it is coded 1 if the respondent has a white-collar job, and 0 for a blue-collar job).
11
Immigrant status will also be included among the control variables. 
Findings
The analyses are presented in table 1. In the first model, not-so-easily changed institutional variables are included -i.e. education, labor force attachment and living place (small community, small town, city, or living in the countryside) -together with the control variables (gender, age, immigrant status, and class). As for education and labor force attachment, the results are in line with the learning theories: higher education, as well as being part of the labor market, seems to have positive impact on tolerance. The coefficient for education is statistically significant on the .01 level. Substantially, e.g., a seven year increase in education is estimated to cause a 3.5 percentage units increase in tolerance, which seems like a rather noticeable change considering the quite low variance in tolerance (the standard deviation is 0.16). When it comes to labor force attachment, individuals who for the moment are not part of the labor force on average score 2.3 percentage units lower on the tolerance scale, controlling for the other factors in the model (however, this effect is significant on the .10 level only). The exception among the learning factors included in the first model is living place, where the signs of the coefficients for the dummies are of the expected kind but no significant effects are discovered. As for living in a city, though, a statistically significant effect -although only on the 0.10 level -is actually reported in model 2 (where political and associational activities are added as controls); individuals living in a city then score 2.2 percentage units higher on the tolerance index than those who live on the countryside. In sum then, though it is not a clear-cut case, living place may affect tolerance to some extent. In model 2, associational and political activities are added. Here statistically and significant effects are discovered in both cases, on the .05 and the .01 levels respectively. Both variables have been logarithmized, and consequently the coefficients are somewhat difficult to interpret substantially. Further calculations however show that both effects are of substantial sizes, in particular when it comes to political participation. 13 In line with the learning theories, more involvement in politics and in associational life indeed seems to lead to more tolerance. Moreover, the findings support the suspicion concerning political participation (mentioned above), that limited support for the impact of this factor in prior Swedish studies might be due to the merging of political activities and attitudes towards political activities, in the measures on political participation. In line with the learning theories, the results here indeed show that participating in political acts itself affects tolerance (effects of attitudes towards political acts could however not be investigated here).
It should be added that the findings seem robust, in the sense that they remain also after controlling for a number of further factors of different kinds (both of a more background character as well as other attitude/behavioral factors; analyses not shown). The exception here is labor force attachment, where the coefficient is substantially reduced and nonsignificant when controlling especially for social trust. Arguably, though, this points not to a spurious effect but to that weak labor force attachment reduces trust in other people, which in turn has a negative influence on tolerance. 14 Hence, contrary to prior Danish and Norwegian studies, being outside of the labor market here seems to increase intolerance.
Admittedly, there are competing theories on the causes of tolerance which were not possible to measure with the data at hand. One example is the impact of perceived threat, a factor that may make us hesitate to involve in certain institutions and activities (e.g., if we perceive these environments and acts as potentially physically threatening), and also may reduce tolerance levels (cf., Sullivan & Transue 1999) , hence potentially making the findings reported above spurious. Moreover, there might be basic psychological dispositions that have an impact both on our tendency to be active in these institutions as well as on our ability to tolerate people who are different from our selves. 15 Only future studies, including measures on these other factors, can show exactly how much the inclusion of these other factors would affect the findings reported here.
Finally, a few words about the control factors' coefficients in table 1. Model 1 points to women scoring somewhat higher on the tolerance scale than men (1.2 percentage units), when controlling for the other factors in the model. Substantially, this must be considered as a small difference, and it is significant on the 0.10 level only (further analyses shows that it is not robust). 16 The coefficients for age are not so easy to interpret, but calculations of estimated values (not shown) indicate that the middle aged are the most tolerant.
As for the immigrant variable, a substantially and statistically significant effect is found in Model 1. The coefficient is negative which means that immigrants score 4.4 percentage units lower on the tolerance scale than individuals who were born in Sweden, when controlling for the other factors in the model. To some extent it is weakened in Model 2, when the associational and political activity variables are included. Apparently, its correlation with tolerance is partly mediated via these two factors; additional analyses (not shown) do confirm lower associational and political activity levels among immigrants than native born individuals, when controlling for the other factors in the model. The large share of the of the immigrant variable on tolerance effect however remains as significant, both substantially and statistically, in Model 2. Further analyses, controlling for several other political attitudes and behavior (e.g., social trust and media exposure) as well as other background factors, do not weaken the effect and, hence, do not reveal any factor working as a mechanism in the causal relationship between the immigrant variable and tolerance. I will return briefly to this topic in the concluding discussion.
Concluding discussion
Prior studies have mostly empirically supported learning theories, showing that participation in different social and political arenas in general increase tolerance. However, this research has been limited to certain parts of the world, the U.S. in particular, and Scandinavia has almost not been studied at all. Given various contextual differences, it is not obvious that the findings will be the same in social democratic welfare states like Sweden.
Here particularly useful Swedish survey data has been analyzed. The findings in general confirm the significance of learning factors also in the Swedish case. Rather convincing support was discovered when it comes to the importance of participating in institutions such as education, working life, and associational life, as well as being politically active. Especially in the case of working life, the result is somewhat surprising, as it was expected that working life may have weaker impact in a Scandinavian welfare state like Sweden (although, admittedly, the reported effect is not so strong). The only exception is living place, as no robust and positive effect of living in a city emerged. The findings in previous international research then seem to apply to the Scandinavian welfare state of Sweden fairly well too.
Future research may benefit from including additional factors. The levels of explained variance were low in the analyses -something this study shares with prior international reports -and there seems to be many unknown causal factors involved. For instance, paying more attention to psychological factors (cf. the big five; Oskarsson & Widmalm 2014; Ekehammar & Akrami 2007) seems like a promising route for future research, something the data at hand did not allow. The interaction between learning factors and psychological factors may also be interesting to investigate: perhaps certain social or political arenas have a particularly strong impact on tolerance among individuals with some specific psychological dispositions? Combining these two research traditions arguably has the potential to develop our understanding of tolerance and its causes.
A final note: The lower levels of tolerance among immigrants than among Swedish born individuals also call for further investigation. This difference came across as rather pronounced and persistent, and the inclusion of learning factors did only affect it to a modest degree. Do these levels differ depending on the democratic or non-democratic traditions of the country where the immigrant was born? Does tolerance change over the years living in Sweden, i.e. does some kind of 'resocialization' take place (for a similar approach concerning political trust, see Adman & Strömblad 2015) ? Future studies are indeed called for, regarding these issues.
Notes
1 Another theoretical perspective focuses on the impact of feeling threatened. Individuals who judge certain groups as threatening more easily become intolerant towards these groups, in order to reduce the feeling of threat (for an overview, see Marquart-Pyatt & Paxton 2007) . Hard competition on the labor market and a minority becoming more successful is one possible 'threat scenario' (Hazama 2010:5) . Hence, perceived threat is a competing mechanism possibly involved in the relationship between unemployment and tolerance.
5 According to some researchers, an approach like this one does not allow a more precise establishment of the level of intolerance since-they argue-this is a dichotomous question: either you are tolerant, or you are not. Establishing such a level is however not the purpose of this paper. I have undertaken the analyses presented below also using a summarized dichotomous measure on tolerance (i.e. dividing between on the one hand those who tolerate all groups and on the other hand those who are intolerant against at least one group). I have also used an index measure on political tolerance where several further groups were included, such as left-wing and right-wing extremists, and racists (this index variable is much less skewed than the one being used in the analyses below show that church attendance -an often used proxy for religious commitment -does not influence tolerance.
13 When moving from being active in no associations to being active in three associations (which is more or less a move from the mean subtracted by one standard deviation to the mean plus one standard deviation, see Table A .1) the expected tolerance increase amounts to two percentage units. The same operation for political participation (which in this case equals a move from participating in one political act to participating in six acts) implies an expected tolerance increase of six percentage units.
14 The relationship between trust and tolerance is most likely reciprocal, i.e., both factors affecting each other, implying that the effect of the former on the latter is over-estimated. 15 Reciprocity, or two-way causality, may also occur, in particular between -one the one handtolerance and -on the other hand -participation in politics and associational life. As a consequence, the effects shown here might be over-estimated, as it is difficult to take this problem into serious consideration with cross-sectional data, which has been used here. On the other hand, especially the effect of political participation on tolerance seems rather strong, and it is unlikely that it only goes from tolerance to participation; rather, it seems likely that some effect of political participation exists. Moreover, I have done further tests (not shown), where discussing politics at home during childhood also was controlled for. This variable is considered to work as a proxy for 'previous political engagement' in a more general sense (in the absence of information on political tolerance at an earlier point in time, which panel data would provide). Although far from being an ideal test, it is worth noticing that the inclusion of this factor does not change the results presented here to any substantial degree. 16 Gender does not have a statistically significant effect on tolerance, when the whole sample is used. The number of respondents being analyzed is then 2015, compared to 1853 in the analyses in table 1, where only those who have values for all the variables in the models are included. 
